Solana co-founder Anatoly Yakovenko has put Ethereum Layer 2 security back in the spotlight with a blunt warning about quantum resistance.
In a post on X, Yakovenko wrote:
“Ethereum L2s are not quantum safe, abandon all hope,”
The line spread quickly because it touches one of crypto’s biggest long-term security questions: what happens to blockchain signatures if practical quantum computers become powerful enough to break today’s public-key cryptography. It also landed just days after Solana developers highlighted progress around Falcon, a post-quantum signature scheme being tested for the network.
Yakovenko’s statement should not be read as a claim that Ethereum L2s are facing an immediate exploit. The issue is structural and long term. Most Ethereum wallets, including users interacting with L2s, rely on ECDSA over secp256k1. Ethereum’s own quantum-resistance roadmap says standard externally owned accounts use ECDSA and that public keys exposed after transactions could become vulnerable to a sufficiently powerful quantum computer.
Ethereum L2s inherit many assumptions from Ethereum’s account and wallet ecosystem. Rollups may differ in proving systems, data availability models, bridges, sequencers, and governance, but user accounts still commonly depend on the same signature standards used across the broader EVM world.
That is the basis for Yakovenko’s attack. If a future quantum threat can target exposed ECDSA public keys, then rollup users are not automatically protected just because they transact on an L2. They still need quantum-resistant account paths, wallet migration tools, and network-level support before the risk becomes urgent.
The debate also arrives while L2 governance and emergency powers are already under scrutiny. Arbitrum’s recent $72 million ETH freeze showed how quickly rollup trust assumptions can become a market-wide governance issue when real funds are at stake.
Solana’s own quantum-readiness effort gives the comment more context. The network’s official quantum-readiness update says Anza and Firedancer independently moved toward Falcon as a compact post-quantum signature option for high-throughput blockchain use.
A related Solana improvement proposal, SIMD-0461, would add Falcon-512 signature verification as a syscall. The proposal is scoped as verification only, does not replace Ed25519, and is described as exploratory while Solana evaluates a broader post-quantum strategy.
That nuance matters. Solana is not fully migrated to a post-quantum account model today. The stronger point is that its core teams are already testing a concrete route, while Yakovenko is using that progress to pressure Ethereum L2s on readiness.
The next serious phase of this debate will not be decided by one quote. It will be decided by wallet migration plans, account abstraction support, signature upgrades, bridge security, and whether major ecosystems can move users to quantum-resistant paths before the threat becomes practical. Yakovenko’s warning turns that distant-sounding problem into a live competitive issue for every rollup that wants to be treated as long-term financial infrastructure.
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